The presence of moral hazard in the banking sector can have worrying results. This paper examines the role of government guarantees to banks in generating moral hazard in Iran. We test for moral hazard among bank creditors by determining whether protected banks received more funds from creditors than non-protected banks. Empirically, to determine the existence of moral hazard among bank manag...

In this paper, I argue that it is quite useful, both theoretically and empirically, to adopt a sociocultural approach to the study of moral development. This entails viewing ‘moral functioning’ as a form of mediated action, and moral development as the process by which persons gradually appropriate a variety of ‘moral mediational means’. Mediated action entails two central elements: an ‘agent’,...

In this paper, we depict and analyze simple models of moral hazard, namely “operating moral hazard” and “investing moral hazard.” First we assume that a corporation exists primarily for the benefit of their shareholders. Then, moral hazard occurs when managers choose an option knowingly that is not optimum for shareholders. We evaluate the loss to shareholders in terms of cash flow to them in t...

moral hazards are the result of an expansive range of factors mostly originating in the patients’ roles. the objective of the present study was to investigate patient incentives for moral hazards using the experiences of experts of basic iranian insurance organizations. this was a qualitative research. data were collected through semi-structured interviews. the study population included all exp...

In a model of dual agency problems where borrower-lender and bank-nonbank incentives may conflict, we predict a hockey stick relation between bank skin in the game and covenant tightness. As bank participation declines covenant tightness increases until reaching a low threshold, at which point the relation sharply reverses and covenant protection is removed with a commensurate increase in sprea...

the purchase of insurance may cause the insureds to increase the costs of insurance companies, compared to their estimation of costs. if after the demand of insurance services, the loss ratio of insurance companies increases because of consumer behavior, moral hazard will be evident. in this paper, after introducing the literature, the presence of moral hazard in iran insurance company is teste...

In this paper, I address the what, the how, and the why of moral phenomenology. I consider first the question What is moral phenomenology?, secondly the question How to pursue moral phenomenology?, and thirdly the question Why pursue moral phenomenology? My treatment of these questions is preliminary and tentative, and is meant not so much to settle them as to point in their answers’ direction.

The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric information. Thereby they correctly anticipate accident probabilities corresponding to effort incentives indu...